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HUMAN EQUALITY AND INTRA- AS WELL AS 
INTERCULTURAL DIVERSITY 
In examining the question "What is common to all people and how do they 
differ?" three typological stages may be distinguished: a Platonic thesis, a roman-
tic antithesis, and a current synthesis—the last a hypothesis that is advanced 
today in human biology and linguistic studies. 
1. The Platonic Thesis 
The locus classicus of the Platonic thesis occurs not in Plato but in the work 
of his pupil, Aristotle, at the beginning of a small and probably early tract De in-
terpretatione: 
Just as written marks are not the same for all human beings, neither are spoken 
sounds. But what these are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the 
same for all; and what these affections are likenesses of—things—are also the same.1 
The suggestion is that people are all concerned with the same things. They also 
have the same mental ideas of these things. The expression of these ideas, how-
ever, varies from culture to culture. 
The philosophy that underlines this view is obviously Platonic: inside and 
outside, being and appearance, and, in the case of language, content and expres-
sion as well as text and context, are opposites. The first member of each pair is 
independent of the second one. The first member contains the essential, is con-
sidered invariable, and is universally the same; in contrast, the second term is 
changeable, particular, and is what it is only by accident. 
Appropriately enough, it is only the linguistic terminology of this "ideol-
ogy" that has changed over the centuries. In Plato's dialogue Cratylos,2 the ideal 
content of a word (to tou onomatos eidos), as something universal, was opposed 
to its syllables (syllabai) as particulars, and in Aristotle's just-quoted treatise "On 
Interpretation," the mental impressions (pathemata tes psyches) were opposed to 
the speech sounds (phonai). Similarly juxtaposed as invariant and variable in the 
Middle Ages were the substantial content of discourse (substantia sermonis) and 
its phonetic articulation (articulatio vocis);3 Leibniz,4 at the turn of the 18th 
century, juxtaposed ideas (les idees) and words (les mots); and Husserl,5 at the 
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beginning of this century, juxtaposed the meaning-categories (Bedeutungskate-
gorien) of languages and the categories of their expression (Ausdruck). In this 
tradition, the view has occasionally been imputed to Chomsky,6 the best-known 
exponent of an alternative view of language universals, that the deep structure of 
languages is universal as opposed to their particular surface structures. Leibniz 
advances the same argument regarding ethics, according to which the concept of 
virtue (la notion de la vertu en general) is the same for all people; only its appli-
cation varies, although, as he remarks, "less than one would think."7 
The designation of this thesis as Platonic is Eurocentric, and contradicts its 
claim to universal validity. It is, in fact, a proverbial dictum common to many 
cultures. 
From the Rig Veda, a collection of hymns dating back to the second millen-
ium B.C., Indian philosophers traditionally quote the proposition, Ekarh sad, vi-
pra bahudha vadanti: "One being, the wise name it differently." Or: "One truth, 
the wise say it differently."8 
In the 9th and 10th or, according to the Muhammadan calendar, the 3rd and 
4th centuries, Al-Farabi, an Islamic philosopher of Turkish descent and born in 
present-day Kazakhstan, taught that (philosophical) truth is universal and mat 
only its (religious) symbols change from nation to nation: unity of (sage) philos-
ophy and diversity of (folk) religions.9 
Possibly in the wake of Islamic precedent, Nicholas of Cusa, in his tract On 
the Peace of Faith, came up with the formula, religio una in rituum varietate: 
"One religion in a diversity of rites/symbols/ceremonies."10 
This same mode of thinking, thus substantiated with quotes from the Rig 
Veda, Plato, Aristotle, Islamic philosophers and medieval grammarians, Cusanus, 
Leibniz, Husserl, and the secondary literature of current linguistics, made a recent 
appearance (1987) in the title of a lecture by Jiirgen Habermas: "The Unity of 
Reason in the Multiplicity of its Voices."11 We are evidently dealing with a very 
deeply rooted mode of thinking. But transcultural spread is not evidence of truth. 
An alternative view of things, which is of theoretical currency today in many 
fields of scholarship and the subject of the third thesis in this paper, is reflected in 
another time-honored, proverbial maxim. Its Chinese origins are telling. It is 
quoted at this juncture because it occasionally receives the same monistic inter-
pretation as the above-cited examples from world literature. It reads: sanjiao - yi 
jia.12 Arthur Schopenhauer transliterates san kiao - i kia and translates "three 
teachings—one family" and reads the slogan as meaning that "the three teachings 
are only one."13 The word jia, rendered by Schopenhauer as 'family', a reading 
that begs a monistic interpretation, actually also means 'house' or 'household'. 
The latter translation allows a presumably older, more accurate, and in any case 
more interesting interpretation: The three teachings complement each other and 
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together they make the house complete. According to one source, the three 
teachings originally meant the three basic values of Confucianism: piety, loyalty, 
and nobility. Later they were said to refer to the three main philosophical currents 
in China: Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. The historical heterogeneity of 
these three world-views, each with different roots in northern China, southern 
China, and India respectively, suggests a complementaristic reading. By contrast, 
the historical affinity of the three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam, which prevail in the Western world, has encouraged uniformistic 
thinking since the Middle Ages and the Age of Enlightenment down to the present 
day. 
If all people are confronted with the same things and acquire the same ideas 
from them, and if only the language with which they lend expression to their 
thoughts varies, then intercultural understanding is not an impossibility; on the 
contrary, it is a relatively simple affair. One need only dispense with the verbal 
shell, the words that sow confusion, and focus on the things themselves, the ideas 
themselves—as put forward by John Locke in the 17th century14 and reiterated by 
Edmund Husserl at the beginning of this century.15 
The most trenchant formulation of this conviction is found in the writings of 
Bishop Berkeley: "We need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest 
tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand."16 
His statement actually embodies three classical convictions all of which 
seem doubtful to us today: (a) Knowledge is possible without language, (b) The 
essence of things, truth, is accessible and not beyond comprehensibility; it does 
not recede the more we reach out to it. (c) Truth is something delicious that 
enhances our well-being; it is not a bitter fruit, not something ominous that we 
had best not engage with. 
2. The Romantic Antithesis 
In the course of the 18th century, the insight gained ground that knowledge 
and language are not independent of each other. In natural languages the phono-
logical and grammatical structure of utterances affect their meaning. Two 
illuminating examples may suffice by way of illustration. 
The German word Alptraum elicits different associations from the English 
word nightmare, despite the fact that both words are derived from the idea of a 
kobold (Elf/Alb; mare) that assails the sleeper. Only with the German word do we 
associate the weight of the Alps, which threaten to crush the dreamer, an idea that 
has gradually affected the meaning of the word. 
In a formalized language, we can enumerate objects regardless of sequence. 
In the operation of addition, which is governed by the law of commutability, it 
makes no difference whether we add 2 + 3 or 3 + 2. Not so with natural 
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languages: Bush and Baker is not equivalent in meaning to Baker and Bush, nor 
is milk and coffee to coffee and milk. In natural languages, the order of a sequence 
contains information. As a rule, order reflects rank. The dominant, more 
important item comes first. If you ask for milk and coffee, then milk is the main 
beverage and coffee the extra; but the rank is reversed when you ask for coffee 
and milk. 
Meaning is affected not only by the manner in which we say something, but 
also by the context in which we use our words. Once again two illustrations shall 
suffice. 
On the European continent, a federal state is seen in terms of the powers that 
are bestowed upon its parts; the Anglo-American view emphasizes the jurisdic-
tion ceded by the parts to the central government. To Europeans, therefore, 
federalism means decentralization; to Anglo-Americans, it means centralization. 
In Germany, the word selbstbewusst designates someone who knows what 
he knows and oozes self-confidence; the same word in England, self-conscious, 
designates someone who knows what he does not know and is acutely aware of 
his limitations. 
Languages differ from each other per definitionem in their phonological and 
grammatical structure, and cultures differ through the context, the historical and 
social framework, in which they use words. It is thus impossible to translate even 
one page of a book written in a natural language into one page of a book in 
another language with the same semantic, associative, and connotative nuances. 
The Platonic thesis was based on the assumption that inside and outside, 
essence and appearance, the essential and the random, and in the case of 
language, content and expression as well as text and context are mutually inde-
pendent. For the romantic antithesis organic, holistic thinking is typical. A 
functional, purposeful, meaningful connection is assumed not only among the 
parts of a single whole, so that no part can be changed or even exchanged without 
affecting all the other parts, but also between form and material or form and 
function (in turn regarded as parts or partial aspects of a whole). Everything is 
linked and attuned to everything else, so much so that the distinction between 
essential and nonessential falls away. 
If meaning depends on expression and text on context, one cannot lay claim 
to equivalence between different languages and different cultures. A typical 
rendition of this romantic view is found in Wilhelm von Humboldt's writings: 
Since all objective perception is inevitably tinged with subjectivity, one can view— 
even apart from language—all human individuality as a singular standpoint of the 
worldview. It is even more so through language . . . ; and since in the same nation a 
similar subjectivity affects language, there lies in every language an idiosyncratic 
worldview. . . . Man lives with things mainly [!], in fact since sensations and actions 
depend on his ideas even exclusively [!], the way they are adduced to him by 
language.17 
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The now commonly accepted linguistic determinism and relativism reflected 
in this passage raises three issues: (a) The extent of linguistic determinism 
remains unclear. Within one and the same sentence, the experience of things is 
declared to be mainly and exclusively dependent upon language, (b) The assump-
tion that objective perception depends on subjective structures takes only two of 
three possible variants into consideration: Variation in subjective structures is 
contingent upon (1) individual and (2) national (cultural) factors. The possibility 
that there may also be (3) species-specific mental structures common to all human 
beings has not entered the argument, (c) Nor is reflection expended upon whether 
variation in the subjective structures of human beings is unlimited and arbitrary 
or whether there are natural constraints to their change (fluctuation), their suit-
ability (convenience) and their practicability (viability). What interests us here is 
whether we really must toe the line of unrestricted pluralism. For pluralism of this 
kind, everything is ultimately no less indifferent than for rationalist forms of 
classical universalism. 
Herder impressively described the logical consequences of the romantic 
cultural model, introduced by him, for intercultural understanding: 
Every nation has its center of bliss within itself as every sphere has its center of 
gravity!—everything that is of the same kind as my nature, that can be assimilated by 
it, I envy, I aspire to, I make my own; beyond that, benevolent nature has armed me 
with insensibility, coldness, and blindness; it may even be contempt and disgust—but 
it only has the purpose of throwing me back upon myself, of giving me enough in the 
center to support me.18 
For Bishop Berkeley of Ireland, the Platonically optimistic view of 
knowledge went hand in hand with an equally optimistic view of the basis of 
human conduct. For Weimar's chief pastor Herder, epistemological relativism 
was paired with an axiological relativism. 
Herder undoubtedly describes something that occurs all too frequently. But 
does he also describe something that alone is humanly possible, that is always the 
case by dint of structure? Does he reveal a relativism to which there is absolute-
ly no alternative? These questions carry weight because Herder's position leads 
to radical consequences that have indeed been taken by radical thinkers. 
Joseph de Maistre, a social scientist at the rightist, restorative end of the 
political spectrum, saw and took the consequences: 
There is no human being in the world. In my life, I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, 
Russians, etc. Thanks to Montesquieu I even know that one can be a Persian. But as 
far as the human being is concerned, I declare that I have never in my life encoun-
tered one; if he exists, then probably without my knowledge.19 
Declarations of this kind are certainly not merely of historical interest. Spurred 
by the current objective of seeking orientation through independent experience of 
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their own, feminists gravitate toward the same conclusion as regards its negative 
side. The positive side is weighted with other priorities. Negative: There is not a 
human species. Positive: There are women and men; females and males. 
History underscores the parallelism. Feminists rightfully draw attention to 
the fact that in cultural anthropology, under the heading of Orientalism, the same 
conceptual dualities and schematic thinking are applied to the difference between 
Asia and Europe as, in psychology and sociology, to the difference between 
woman and man. 
Anthropology today, especially anthropology of a biological and linguistic 
orientation, offers a means of escaping the hopelessly oversimplifying dichoto-
mies of European vs. Asian and masculine vs. feminine in the sense of intellec-
tual vs. sensual, rational vs. emotional, legalistic vs. opportunistic/pragmatic, 
predictable vs. unpredictable, etc.20 This escape might be elaborated by reflect-
ing on a contemporary formulation of the conclusion drawn by radical thinkers 
from Herder's position, a formulation found in the work of a social scientist—the 
already mentioned Jiirgen Habermas—at the other, emancipatory end of the 
political spectrum, albeit in an early article which probably reflects the view of 
his teachers more than the own current persuasion: 
The human being does not exist any more than the language does. Since people first 
make themselves into what they are and each does so differently, according to the cir-
cumstances, there are certainly societies or cultures about which general statements 
can be made as they can be made about species of plants or kinds of animals; but not 
about the human being.21 
I shall now proceed to argue that it is more likely that the contrary applies. 
3. The Current Synthesis (A Hypothesis) 
The following assumption, diametrically opposed to Habermas's statement, 
may prove a fruitful principle for the human sciences: 
It is easier to make general statements (species-specific) about the human 
being: statements that apply to all human beings, only to human beings and not 
to other living beings as well, than to make general statements (population-
specific) about one culture (or one society, one "race," one nation, one epoch, one 
sex) that apply to all members of that one culture (society, "race," nation, epoch, 
sex), only to them and not to members of other cultures (other societies, other 
"races," other nations, other epochs, the other sex). 
Striking, scientifically authoritative proof of this principle is furnished by 
the biologist Stephen Jay Gould: 
Human equality is a contingent fact of history. The great preponderance of human 
variation occurs within groups, not in the differences between them.22 
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To what extent does this principle entail a synthesis of the Platonic and romantic 
models? This question is best answered and elucidated by dividing the three 
models—the Platonic, the romantic, and the current synthetic model—into sever-
al subtheses, regarding (1) the kind of universality, (2) the domain of variability, 
(3) the relationship of content to form that governs the three models, (4) the con-
ception of the world, (5) the matching conception of the value system, (6) the 
structure of languages, (7) the determining factor of Weltanschauung, and (8) the 
possibility of intercultural understanding. 
(1) The Kind of Universality. Within current linguistic research, there is a 
strong group that shares the view with the Platonic model of Antiquity, the 
Middle Ages, and the Enlightenment that there is something common to all 
human beings. It even goes beyond traditional grammatica universalis doctrines. 
According to the latter, universals are essentially found on the level of semantic 
categories and not on the level of linguistic expression. Universals of expression, 
such as the distinction between vowels and consonants, were considered irrele-
vant or even disregarded altogether. Recent, empirical research into universals, 
on the other hand, characteristically takes the level of expression as its very point 
of departure.23 Its most impressive successes lie in the field of speech sounds and 
the formation of words and sentences, most effectively and popularly illustrated 
by the structure of semantic fields, such as words for colors, numbers, kinship, the 
designation of body parts, personal pronouns, etc. 
In contrast to the Platonic model, however, very few universals are now 
claimed to be ontologically necessary although the existence of some essential 
universals is undeniable. Remarkably, they are the subject of investigation today 
in an area where they are least anticipated, in pragmatics. The ability to make a 
(meaningful) promise is dependent on the ability to believe that the promised is 
possible and desirable for the addressee. 
Empirical linguistics addresses entirely different universals, as in the 
following illustration from the field of numerals.24 Natural languages express 
higher numbers by utilizing equivalents of basic mathematical operations. It is 
thereby (hypothetically) assumed that subtraction is not used in any language 
unless addition is used as well. And in the case of subtraction, it holds that the 
subtrahend, the number to be subtracted, is smaller than the remainder. In Latin, 
the word for 18 has the structure of 20 — 2: duodeviginti. In no natural language 
can a word be found with the structure of 20 — 72 for 8. Such a numerical word-
system is logically possible and conceivable without inconsistency. 
This unprepossessing illustration is remarkable. It proves that not everything 
that is logically possible is necessarily natural. We can use structural and func-
tional considerations to explain the principles that it substantiates, principles 
which are related to our cognitive faculties and can be economically explained in 
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relation to them. The illustration shows, moreover, that we unconsciously adhere 
to structural and functional constraints without having the slightest notion that we 
are doing so. Finally, it refutes the Platonic argument according to which only the 
essential, the vital, the fundamental is common to all people, and the romantic 
doctrine, according to which—at most—only unspecific structures of extreme, 
almost trivial abstractness can be universal but not concrete details for which 
there is no necessity.25 
(2) The Domain of Variability. According to the Platonic model, variability 
is restricted to sensory surface structure. According to the romantic model, there 
are no constraints upon variation, neither horizontal, between the essential and 
the nonessential, nor vertical, in the structure of a particular culture. The current 
model, in contrast, acknowledges a profound but still not unrestricted variability. 
It holds that the romantic thesis with its assumption of homogeneous "peoples" 
(Kulturnationen) does not do justice to the specialness, complexity, and richness 
of the variability that is characteristic of mankind. There are, on the one hand, 
ideas and values that are shared by certain strata of society and certain occupa-
tions above and beyond cultural borders. A European farmer may feel a greater 
affinity with a Chinese farmer than with a city dweller in his own country. 
Similarly, in natural languages there are laws for the structure of semantic fields 
that assert themselves independently of linguistic family and type. On the other 
hand, distinctions can be found within one and the same culture that are no 
different in manner or extent from the distinctions between cultures. The same 
conflict regarding different ideas and values that occurs between different people 
(intersubjectively: intraculturally as well as interculturally) is often found within 
the single, more reflective person (intrasubjectively). 
According to the romantic idea, a culture is a self-contained, homogeneous 
whole, centralized and hierarchically dominated from its center. But cultures and 
languages have no fixed boundaries due to their function, their living conditions, 
and the interests of their members. The transitions between them are flowing. Nor 
are they as homologous as was taught by Oswald Spengler in the first half and by 
Michel Foucault in the second half of this century.26 Spengler states "that 
between the differential calculus and the dynastic principle of the state in the age 
of Louis XTV, between the ancient form of the city state and Euclidean geometry, 
[ . . . ] between contrapuntal instrumental music and the economic credit system, 
there exists a deep affinity of form."27 
Individual cultures, like their physiological vehicle, the human brain, are not 
homologous and uniform, as the romantic concept of the organism would have it, 
but rather modular.28 Different tasks are carried out with different procedures 
(modules). These are but loosely related and often not particularly well attuned to 
each other. Little else is to be expected, given their function and their genesis. The 
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idea of homologous/homogeneous development applies neither to cultures nor to 
biological organisms. To cite Claude L6vy-Strauss's anthropological metaphor 
transferred by Francois Jacob to the field of biology, they are the result of 
tinkering (bricolage), makeshift constructions contingent on environment-
specific needs and arising out of whatever happens to be at hand.29 
(3) Content and Form. The divergence of the three models of culture stems 
from their different approaches to the relationship between content and (external) 
form. The Platonic view holds that form and content are mutually independent; 
the romantic idea of a whole declares the opposite. Research as it stands today ac-
knowledges and retains the romantic assumption of a natural interdependence of 
content and form as a step forward, but not the unrestricted extension of this in-
terdependence to the entire context.30 
Only by distinguishing the interdependence of content and its form of ex-
pression from the interdependence of text and context can one understand how 
content-defined cultural universals are even possible. If content depends on form, 
and if the formal means used by languages are to a considerable extent univer-
sally the same, then universal traits may also be anticipated, on the level of 
content, in the concrete manner in which the world is experienced and contrived. 
On the other hand, universals of content are only possible if cultures are not tra-
ditional wholes in which each part strictly depends on every other part. Since 
every culture has its own history and its own geographical area, it would follow, 
from the romantic idea of the whole, that every sector of a given culture with its 
dependence on the specific cultural context is special, unique, and down to the 
finest detail fundamentally different from corresponding sectors in other cultures. 
But if cultures are nonclassical, nonromantic wholes, in which strict relations of 
interdependence apply only locally and regionally but not globally, then sectors 
of different cultures can be compared to each other. It is then possible that, 
because they have the same form, corresponding fields of objects in different 
cultures will be subject to the same laws—despite the difference in the overall 
cultural framework. This is precisely the conclusion suggested by linguistic field 
research when it observes the same laws at work in the word-fields of different 
languages. 
(4) The Conception of the World. According to the Platonic model of culture 
"that which holds the world together in its inmost being" (Goethe) does so as a 
matter of ontological necessity. Only its sensible appearances are a matter of 
chance. The world as viewed by the romantic model, in contrast, is either struc-
tureless, amorphous (Saussure: "ce royaume flottant"31), chaotic (Whorf: "a 
kaleidoscopic flux"32), or of a structure subject to indefinite change (A. R. 
Wallace: "On the Tendency of Varieties to Depart Indefinitely from the Original 
Type"33), or of an inscrutable structure (Quine: "inscrutability of reference"34), or 
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of a structure subject to indefinite interpretation (Duhem: "underdeterminacy of 
physical theories"35). 
According to the synthetic model, nature, including that of the human 
species, is also of an astonishing but by no means unbounded variability. In 
physics, in biology, and in the human sciences, researchers always come across 
states that are more stable ("more natural") than others, their stability being 
something which can be explained by their structure or function.36 Moreover, the 
world seems to be a whole whose parts cannot all be realized at once, but only al-
ternatively or complementarily. The realization of certain possibilities excludes 
that of others. According to both the classical and romantic ideal of the whole, 
which holds that every part is dependent upon every other part, the perfection of 
single parts presupposes the unrestricted presence and display of all the other 
parts. According to the current, alternative model of wholes, the parts that go to 
form a whole may be mutually incompatible and may exclude simultaneous real-
ization.37 
(5) The Conception of the Value System. According to the Platonic model, 
values form a hierarchical, pyramid-shaped, harmonious, universally valid and 
therefore stable system. According to the romantic model, there are several such 
pyramids of values, each with a different topmost value, a different focus, a 
different orientation. The ranking of the values is labile, varying from culture to 
culture and from epoch to epoch. Something may be valuable in one culture that 
is worthless or even bad in another. The current synthetic model shares with the 
romantic model the idea of variable orders of values, but tends to share with the 
Platonic model the view that the exchangeability of positive and negative signs is 
a misunderstanding. Involved here is not a classical relativity of values (what is 
good for one person is bad for the other, or conversely), but rather a polytheism 
of values, as a battle not between God and the Devil but between different Gods, 
a conflict of goods, a dispute about what is more and what is less important.38 On 
the other hand, no order of values, not even a compromise among orders of 
values, is without negative side effects. Unlike the Platonic model, there is no 
unidirectional development for the current model—neither ontogenetically, from 
the world of the child to the world of the adult, nor historically, from a tradition-
al to a modern society—that is, in every respect, an evolution toward the good, a 
progression from something faulty to something perfect. 
The values cherished by all humans or only by individual cultures or even 
only by single individuals do not form a hierarchical but rather a heterarchical 
system. Heterarchical thinking distinguishes the current model of culture from 
both the Platonic and the romantic models.39 Not infrequently several values, 
whose optimal realization is not simultaneously possible, may assert themselves 
with the same tenacity. As to the decision to be made in a concrete conflict of 
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values, there is no permanent, intersubjective agreement, and, given a nondog-
matic state of mind, there is no intrasubjective conviction without uncertainty. 
(6) The Structure of Languages. According to the Platonic model, the 
surface structure of languages happens to be the way it is—changeable and par-
ticular. Inasmuch as people do not, by nature, form the appropriate linguistic 
designations with respect to things and their ideas, it is the task of philosophers 
to secure the correctness of names (Kong Fu Zi: zheng ming40; Plato: onomaton 
orthotes41) so that (according to Plato) words and sentences render things as they 
are or so that (according to Confucius) people and their artefacts correspond to 
the designations that were once advisedly established for them. 
According to the romantic model, languages, their expression and meaning, 
are what they are through historical contingency. Their structure is not accessible 
to foreigners through the things of the world which they designate, but only by 
deciphering (cracking42) the code of which they are constituted, i.e., the subjec-
tive attitude that determined the choice of code. 
According to the new model, the structure of languages and the possible di-
rections their change may take are determined by phylogenetic and neurological 
factors and show an astonishing degree of similarity among all people. The 
universal laws regarding expression in language, which are empirically investi-
gated and "naturally" explained in terms of the languages' structure and function, 
entail universal laws regarding the meaning level of languages as well, due to the 
interdependence of form and content. 
(7) The Determining Factor of Weltanschauung. According to the Platonic 
model, the structure of the world determines the structure of the (mental) image 
of the world—universally and always in the same way. Only the structure of the 
sensory experience of the world depends, like that of linguistic forms of expres-
sion, on happenstance. 
According to the romantic model, the structure of language determines the 
structure of the (sensory and intellectual) Weltanschauung—in each case in 
different ways. The structure of language depends on the structure of the way a 
"people" lives, and this in turn on the historical (social) and geographical 
(climatic) living conditions. 
According to the current model, the structure of brain and mind determines 
both the structure of the (sensory and intellectual) Weltanschauung and that of 
language—universally, following the same constraints of variation in a diversity 
of ways. Nature, brain, culture, and language are to a large extent the outcome of 
co-evolution in the early stages of human history.43 
(8) The Possibility of Intercultural Understanding. According to the Platonic 
model, understanding between cultures is possible through recourse to things and 
to the ideas that people naturally acquire of these things. 
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According to Herder's romantic model, a culture will appreciate foreign 
cultural achievements only insofar as they can be assimilated. Adoption is equiv-
alent to integration. Understanding is pursued from the culture's own point of 
view and never from that of the foreign culture. 
For the current model, four insights are decisive: 
(a) Phenomena can be defined in various cultures that transcend linguistic 
constraints and are subject to the same laws. Such universal laws form a bridge-
head from which a foreign culture can be accessed. 
(b) Every person is able to acquire any language and any culture into which 
she or he is born. Foreign cultures give us access to possibilities of development 
which are apparently at our disposal by nature and which only circumstances 
prevent from appearing in our own culture. Different cultures develop different 
human skills to varying degrees. 
(c) The same problems of understanding, encountered through contact with 
a foreign culture, confront us in our own culture when we address past epochs or 
nascent developments. We grow into our own multi-shaped culture by learning in 
childhood to take different standpoints and pit them against each other. 
(d) As everyone knows from acquiring a second language, our passive com-
petence is superior to our active competence. We understand more than we can 
ourselves say. It is easier for us to imitate a model or to perform according to in-
struction than to develop something independently and creatively. Therefore, if 
we are bogged down in our own culture with our own history, it is wise to take a 
look at foreign traditions.44 
Elmar Holenstein 
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